The Centre for Ethics and Humanism of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel is very pleased to announce the second edition of the Annual ETHU Seminar: three philosophy lunch talks on the topic of ‘recognition’ by international scholars.
All sessions take place at the VUB Campus Etterbeek, Room 5.C.402 (Profzaal), Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels.
Attendance is free (incl. free lunch), but registration is needed (max. 20 participants, check the deadlines for each session).
For registration and further information, contact Emiliano.Acosta@vub.ac.be.
Friday 18 March, 12 PM:
Three Models of Social Invisibility
Louis Carré (Université de Namur)
Deadline for registration: 14 March
Louis Carré is postdoctoral researcher at UNamur on the ARC project “Philosophie critique de l’à-venir”. He is also teaching at USL and at ULB. He published Axel Honneth. Le droit de la reconnaissance (Paris, 2013). His research focuses on Hegel, theories of recognition, critical theory, and contemporary social and political philosophy.
Friday 15 April, 12 PM:
Recognition as a Normative Concept
Jakub Kloc-Konkolowicz (Philosophy Institut, Warschau/Institut für Sozialforschung, Frankfurt a.M.):
Deadline for registration: 11 April
Recognition is one of the most important notions in contemporary social theory, but also one of the biggest challenges that modern pluralistic societies face. Trying to explain the ‘career’ of the notion of recognition in contemporary practical philosophy and in social sciences, I point to the fact that due to a strong reception of some Hegelian ideas (e.g. by the representatives of the Frankfurt School) the category of recognition is usually interpreted from the perspective of social struggle (‘struggle for recognition’). This generates some important problems, both within the framework of interpretation of the recognition processes and with regard to general aims of social theory. The strong emphasis on the ‘militant’ dimension of recognition may result in choosing a purely descriptive strategy in analysing this important social phenomenon. This strategy must be seen as insufficient if one assumes that the aim of social philosophy consists not only in the correct analysis of acts and processes of recognition, but also in working out criteria by which the claims for recognition made by individuals and social groups may be initially evaluated. The ‘normative concept of recognition’ can thus be described as an attempt to determine such criteria through demonstrating duties and commitments which are implied by mutual recognition processes. These processes are seen as a source of moral and legal commitments undertaken both by those granting recognition as well as by those aspiring to it (‘recognition as commitment’).
Born 1975; 1994-98 study of philosophy and Polish philology (in the framework of Interdisciplinary Humanist Studies) at the University of Warsaw; 2000/2001 Scholarship of DAAD at the University in Tübingen (Germany); 2002–2003 Scholarship of FNP (Foundation for Polish Science); 2004 Dissertation on Primacy of the Practical Reason in the Classical German Philosophy: Kant and Fichte; since 2004 senior research assistant in the Chair in Social Philosophy in the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Warsaw; 2005 Prize of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland for the dissertation; 2006-2008 Scholarship of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in the J.W. Goethe-University in Frankfurt am Main; since 2009 Head of the German Philosophy Research Center of the Institute of Philosophy in the University of Warsaw; 2014 Winner of the Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel-Prize of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (upon the nomination by Axel Honneth).
Friday 13 May, 12 PM:
Institutionalizing recognition? Or how to classify institutions?
Christian Lazzeri (Université Paris Ouest)
Deadline for registration: 9 May
This lecture delineates a typology of political institutions in connection with the exchange and the distribution of diverse forms of recognition. Taking for granted that collective mobilizations and conflict in contemporary societies address claims to recognition to the institutions (claims to rights, promotions, certifications, or multiple public statements), this typology distinguishes between three “pure” categories of institutional practices: between social practices by which institutions express social norms of recognition; practices by which institutions correct the “distortions” in the exchange or distribution of recognition and those by which they produce directly recognition (as public esteem). These “pure”categories may obviously be combined, and through the study of these combinations, this conference “tests” the validity of such a typology.