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## 1. Ukrainian Social Knowledge and Secession

### Introduction

Social knowledge is a mode of diagnosis and cognizance of the *problématique* of the social world. When 'social world' and 'things social' are taken in the broad sense of the term, they encompass not only civil society, but also the historical, political and economic realms. This distinct mode of knowing about the social world developed in the nineteenth century into specific disciplines. The distinction between the social sciences and the humanities then as now, remains, however, problematical and is very much country-specific. The quest for knowledge of 'things social' evolved in a variety of ways. Early social-knowledge-generating cognoscenti were diverse in terms of training and focus. Some were scholars and academics, while others were amateurs and even dilettantes. There has not always been a clear demarcation, either in the past or today, between the tasks of a rational apprehension of social knowledge, the diagnosis of 'things social', and the effort of 'advocating', 'teaching' and 'ameliorating' societies and nations. These social-knowledge-generating cognoscenti were to be found in numerous sites. They operated within and through civic organizations, the civil service and educational-academic institutions. Some of the specifically knowledge-generating academic-educational institutional arrangements were in the public sphere, while others were found in civil society.

Whatever the case, the individuals involved were the formulators, explainers and transmitters of discourses about the issues of the social world. They were the makers of knowledge and the manipulators of meanings. It was they who determined the nature of social knowledge, in terms of what it was about and what it was for. In some cases social knowledge contributed towards the legitimization of the existing set-ups, while in other situations it was conducive towards alterations and changes. Since these individuals put forth experiential knowledge pertaining to how social, political, economic and national affairs were to be made sense of, they were the shapers of the consciousness of the population at

large and, to some extent, of public affairs. These cognoscenti acted as 'public intellectuals' and their knowledge-bearing communities occupied a privileged space in their societies. Despite the fact that the knowledge produced was the task of individuals, it was also contingent on the society-specific intellectual traditions and the configuration of knowledge-formulating and -bearing institutions. The nature of the political regime and the political-bureaucratic arrangements also impacted on the construction and the nature of social knowledge. In most societies today, social knowledge is primarily constructed by academia-based social scientists, and the instrumental aspect of the social sciences has become somewhat attenuated, but it has not disappeared.<sup>1</sup>

## The Emergence of Ukrainian Social Knowledge

Ukrainian social science offers an apt illustration of the above-stated generalizations. It emerged in very specific circumstances: those characterized by the 'statelessness' of the Ukrainian nation. This arduous condition derived from the fact that the territory that comprises contemporary Ukraine was divided for centuries among the contiguous states – although, by the nineteenth century, Ukrainian lands were found principally within the Tsarist and Austro-Hungarian empires. Nineteenth-century Ukrainians interested in forging knowledge were found in both the public and the private spheres. These public intellectuals were not only the makers of social knowledge, they were also the 'teachers of the nation', and as such concerned by various 'things social' of the Ukrainian community. They were advocates of causes, including that of the altering of the existing political and cultural situation. These public intellectuals made sense of public affairs, and as such acted as moulders of consciousness of the population at large.

Several Ukrainian 'national revivals' (*natsional'ne vidrodzhennya*) emerged and suffered a demise in the Tsarist Empire during the so-called 'long' nineteenth century (1780s-1918). Such revivals were more sustained in the Austro-Hungarian empire. All of the revivals were the work of public intellectuals. Each renewal was accompanied by the development of Ukrainian scholarship, an enterprise involving scholars and at times amateurs in the field. 'Ukrainian studies' (*ukrainoznavstvo* or *ukrainistyka*), an early manifestation of studentship, were marked by an exclusive concern with the acquisition of social knowledge about things Ukrainian. Even though *ukrainistyka* dealt with many fields of knowledge, historical studies, philology and literature constituted the de facto quintessence of this field of reflection. While *ukrainoznavstvo* started off primarily from a humanities perspective, the social science dimension was layered on when the social sciences began to develop in Europe in the nineteenth century. Ukrainian

studies were therefore a hybrid, 'socio-humanities' domain of knowledge. They were based on an ill articulated, but often taken-for-granted undercurrent which adumbrated that knowledge about things Ukrainian was grounded on culture. Thus, *ukrainoznavstvo* qualified as knowledge, because it was insinuated that it was founded on a Ukrainian cultural knowledge. The idea of cultural knowledge, though also not well articulated, was inferred to be true and was uncontested precisely because it was based on the assumption that it was shared collectively by the national community.

Notwithstanding this condition, Ukrainian studies were far from being a holistic field of knowledge devoid of internal differentiation. Various approaches were present. An ideographic or figurative representation of ideas was intertwined with an attempt to find general stipulations as to Ukrainian development. This nomothetic reasonableness spilled over into a diachronic basis of argumentation that focused on historical development in time. There was also, however, an approach featuring a synchronic focus on descriptions that underlined specific eras, past or present. Even though these socio-humanities were replete with references to meaningful sequences in Ukrainian history, attributed to agents or structures, narratives concerning national origin were also present. Open or latent interpretations of historical sequences and narrative scripts were interspersed with generalizations concerning national character. *Ukrainoznavstvo* often tended to focus on nation and society – collective entities – rather than on individuals. However, the strong concern with social processes and social change, evident in Ukrainian studies, contributed towards the nation- and society-building projects of the Ukrainian public intellectuals. Ukrainian studies were therefore unquestionably instrumental in precipitating the catch-up course of nineteenth-century Ukrainian nation-building.

Informed by social knowledge, the national project of the public intellectuals was oriented towards the construction of a Ukrainian 'imagined community'. This building process operated via self-definition as well as a through a mode of positing Ukrainian national identity and character in contradistinction to those of the neighbouring nations. Generally speaking, Ukrainian studies offered normative-explanatory cognitive schemes and generated a social knowledge that was in the rationalist intellectual tradition of reasoning. Finally, there was a 'concerned' dimension to some of *ukrainoznavstvo*. The *engagé* and advocative characteristics of the discourse of this learning resided in the concern to 'enlighten' and educate Ukrainian society or the national community. This trait was very much in keeping with the instrumentalist tradition of nineteenth-century social sciences. It exalted the thought of the 'betterment' and 'amelioration' of the Ukrainian society and nation. This cognitive assessment on the part of public intellectuals of the Ukrainian 'national question', in the Tsarist and eventually the Austro-Hungarian empires, was entwined with an instrumentalist 'solution'.

This made the public intellectuals something akin to ‘policy intellectuals’ – as was evident in the built-in assumption found in the socio-humanities of the *ukrainoznavstvo* variety, of a ‘nation to state’ path of Ukrainian development. In this respect, the ‘concerned’ feature of Ukrainian studies contributed towards the formation of a Ukrainian independence movement, and may be considered to have been a distant cause of early twentieth-century Ukrainian political independence itself.<sup>2</sup>

The national revival at the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and their accompanying learning, manifested a primary concern with the task of a scholarly legitimization of the Ukrainian Cossack polity of the recent past. Both the Cossack Hetmanate and the Zaporizhs’ka Sich were glorified, and the liquidation of both by the tsarist regime in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was decried. The subsequent national renewal that followed was deeply concerned with popular culture and everything Ukrainian that was ‘folk’ (*narodne*). By the mid-nineteenth century and in the 1870s, the revival exhibited a preoccupation with Ukrainian political history, past political institutions and the elaboration of projects for national development. In the time span preceding the first world war and during the era of the establishment of the Ukrainian statehood of 1917-20, stress was placed on combating rampant Russification in the Tsarist Empire, as well as Russian-centred scholarship. There is evidence of a romantic idealization at that time of the Ukrainian ‘people’, its customs and traditions, popular peasant culture, Cossack heritage, Ukrainian language, and so on, while de-emphasizing the institutional political agents of the Ukrainian past. Even though an ebb followed each revival, the overall process was a cumulative one. Scholarship and activism led to a step-by-step enhancement of national consciousness. The study of things Ukrainian emerged as a form of social knowledge that was in itself an important factor at the close of World War I, helping Ukrainians to divest themselves of the notion of Ukrainian ‘statelessness’ as something that could not be altered. In the process, social knowledge contributed towards Ukrainian *indépendantiste* thought and the eventual statehood of the 1917-20 period.<sup>3</sup>

The process of institutionalizing Ukrainian studies was a complex one. There were some within-system elements as well as those that operated exclusively within Ukrainian civil society. Attempts to institutionalize this scholarship in the public sphere may be traced back to the newly established Kharkiv and Kyiv universities, in the early nineteenth century. However, it is the Kyiv Archeographic (Arkheograficheskaya) Commission of 1843 that had an extremely important positive impact. This state-affiliated institution was set up with the explicit aim of deriding Ukrainian studies. In the process, the task of the Commission was to justify tsarist Russificatory policies by documenting the supposed ‘Russianness’ of the Ukrainians – an idea propagated at that time not only by the public authorities but also by the official, Russocentric tsarist scholarship.

Paradoxically, the results were contrary to those anticipated. The Kyiv Archeographic Commission, staffed to some degree by Ukrainian public intellectuals, actually documented the opposite. The idea of the distinctness of the Ukrainians bolstered Ukrainian studies. However, since by mid-nineteenth century the regime intensified its Russification policy, Ukrainian public intellectuals resorted to establishing Ukrainian social learning outside of the official channels. Operating on the periphery of the highly statist Tsarist Empire, the public intellectuals set up a loose network of clandestine educational-academic associations (*hromady*) within civil society. They remained as such until 1905. The aim of these organizations was to strengthen both the academic and the 'concerned' aspects of scholarship. However, the regime quickly reacted to this form of national revival, often called the 'Ukrainophile' movement (*ukrainofil'stvo*). The activities of the *hromady* were perceived by the public authorities as fomenting Ukrainian political separatism. Since the regime had already qualified the findings of the Archeographic Commission as politically unacceptable, it also clamped down on the *hromady* by the early 1860s. The secret Valuev circular of 1863 actually banned these and other Ukrainian educational-academic enterprises. Furthermore, the Valuev circular also severely restricted Ukrainian-language publications, thereby contributing towards the curtailment of Ukrainian scholarship and social knowledge.<sup>4</sup>

Despite these disconcerting and off-putting measures aimed at Ukrainian knowledge-generating institutions and individuals on the part of the absolutist-bureaucratic political system, the clandestine Ukrainian civil society academic-educational institutional arrangements were again reactivated by the mid 1860s and early 1870s. Continuing to operate on the periphery of the sanctioned state-bureaucratic ones, the society-based associations impacted on those of the public sphere. The most important of the civil society institutions, the Kyiv Hromada, actually contributed to setting up the South-Western Branch of the Imperial Russian Geographic Society. During the short existence (1873-76) of this independent academic institution, there was an enhancement of the socio-humanities in Ukraine, and an expansion of Ukrainian social knowledge. The Historical Society of Nestor the Chronicler (1873) was another Kyiv-based knowledge-generating organization which also enhanced Ukrainian scholarship. But again, the national revival and the accompanying Ukrainian scholarship were singled out by the tsarist government. The authorities accused the Kyiv and other *hromady* of propagating Ukrainophile ideas, which were again identified with Ukrainian separatism. The secret Ems Ukase of 1876 and other subsequent tsarist edicts reinforced the restrictions on Ukrainian studies. This led to the closing down of the South-Western Branch. Ukrainian-language publications were further curtailed.<sup>5</sup>

By the 1880s there was another rebirth of Ukrainian knowledge-producing institutional arrangements, and of scholarship. The Kyiv Hromada established the *Kievskaya starina* in 1887. This unofficial and privately financed *hromada* mouthpiece was published in Russian from 1887 to 1906, and afterwards in Ukrainian, as *Ukraina*. For over a quarter of a century this periodical publication acted in tsarist Ukraine as an unofficial Ukrainian learned society. However, given the repeated governmental restrictions placed on Ukrainian scholarship in the tsarist part of Ukraine, the Ukrainian public intellectuals in Austria-Hungary established a comparable knowledge-generating institution. The legally constituted Shevchenko Scientific Society was set up in L'viv in 1873. It would function until the 1920s, as the de facto Ukrainian Academy of Sciences for all of the Ukrainian territories. Divided into sections, this association allowed for the development of the humanities and the emerging social sciences within both the Economics and the Historical-Philosophical Sections. When in 1905 the political climate improved in the tsarist part of Ukraine, a new learned institution was set up there in 1907. Called the Ukrainian Scientific Society, it duplicated not only the organizational arrangements of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, but also its academic activities. Social science-oriented activities were located in the Economic History, History, Law and Ethnography Sections. All of these scholarly associations continued throughout the first world war. It is in the context of this series of national revivals and institution-building attempts that nineteenth-century Ukrainian historiography emerged. What is referred to as a nineteenth-century phenomenon really spans a longer period, until 1918. If historical studies constituted one of the core elements of the socio-humanities-bearing *ukrainoznavstvo*, historiography was something of a keystone in this edifice.<sup>6</sup>

## Ukrainian Historiography as Social Knowledge: the Early Stages

Ukrainian historiography, like any national historiography, acted as a vehicle for the formulation, invention, recovery or rediscovery of the Ukrainian historical past and the institutionalization of collective memory. It evolved epistemic formulations, which acted as *référentiels* for the acquisition of Ukrainian social knowledge about the Ukrainian past. Using representations, narrative scripts and myths, the historiography made sense of the past and institutionalized a collective national memory. Since the myths as markers, signs and symbols put forth by Ukrainian historiography were socially embedded in national cultural knowledge, they were readily acceptable to the historiographers' audience. Consequently, the historiographical narratives were perceived as true and valid. In addition, it must be remembered that Ukrainian historiography was not an

exclusively academic endeavour. It was also linked to politics, representing at least a symbolic form of public intellectual resistance to the politics of the states comprising Ukrainian territories. Ukrainian social knowledge reprehended the situation in which the Ukrainian national community found itself. In order to remedy this situation, it promoted the ideas of national freedom and national self-determination. The innate elements of 'advocacy' found in Ukrainian historiography made it a malleable national symbol. It is in this capacity that historiography as social knowledge contributed not only to the institutionalization of a collective national memory, but also to the forging of the Ukrainian 'imagined community.' In the final analysis, historiography also helped in the making of a politicized national identity, in the form of patriotism or nationalism.<sup>7</sup>

Ukrainian historiography established itself partially in contraposition to the official Russian historiography of the tsarist part of Ukraine. The tsarist authorities and official state scholarship viewed this development with alarm, because of its perceived latent regime-disruptive potential. Not only did the new historiography put an effective end to the idea propagated by regime-authoritative erudition – that Ukraine was 'without history' – but it also connoted that its audience, the Ukrainian population, was to unlearn the official state version. Ukrainian historiography demonstrated that a distinct Ukrainian history was a social fact. This evidence became an undisputed assumption and a reference point for all future Ukrainian historiographical developments in the following century. Compared to tsarist historiography, this new-fashioned one produced fundamental research that diverged in assumptions, hypotheses, schemata, scripts and myths.

A cognitive-normative dissonance developed between the tsarist and Ukrainian versions of social knowledge. This was due primarily to the fact that the prevalent tsarist historiography was based on an assumption and a myth of an alleged 'Russian unity' bolstered by the 'Russian idea', as well as the Russian state. A supposed 'all-Russian' (*obshcherusskaya*) community was claimed to exist. It encompassed not only the Russians, but also the Ukrainians and the Belorussians. For this tsarist-supported historiography, Kyivan Rus' was the first Russian state and the Tsarist Empire was a linear, dynastic and national continuation of it. Consequently, the very idea of the separation of any components of this *obshcherusskaya* community was incompatible with this political myth. When, at various points in history, portions of this alleged community assumed a separate existence (as was the case with Ukraine), the official historiography disavowed it. Such outcomes were not only professed to be temporary aberrations, but were abjured as being artificial, undesirable and lacking in legitimacy. There was no room in the dominant tsarist historiography for any notion of a distinct Ukrainian people or nation, and even less for a separate Ukrainian polity. The inhabitants of Ukraine were basically assumed to be Rus-

sians with 'borderland peculiarities'. Consequently, Ukrainian social scientists who rejected the notion of a 'one and indivisible' Russia were accused by the official historiography of tendentiousness and nationalism. The very fact of raising the 'Ukrainian question', even at an academic level, was considered to be an act of perfidy, treachery and disloyalty, if not treason itself. Scholarly and publicist tsarist publications disavowing alleged Ukrainian 'separatism' attest to this.<sup>8</sup>

The crux of Ukrainian historiography was its assertion that the Ukrainians were a distinct and singular people, a nation with its own culture, history, collective memory and myths, in addition to historical knowledge. This Ukrainian-centred notion became a founding assumption as well as a social fact. Since this notion could not possibly fit into the officially advocated myths, it was derided by the regime's scholarship as constituting a 'myth' in the negative sense of the word, that is, a form of falsehood. The 'statist' (*derzhavnytska*) emphasis or orientation in Ukrainian historiography underlined the thesis of a continuing Ukrainian statehood throughout national history, despite interruptions, from Kyivan Rus' to the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Cossack Hetmanate polity and the Zaporizhs'ka Sich. It stressed the role of institutional structures and political agents. The 'populist' (*narodnytska*) version of historiography focused on the myth of the historical continuity of a Ukrainian people (*narod*) that was a holistic and almost undifferentiated entity with a similarly constituted adjunct culture. The Ukrainian *narod* was claimed to be distinct from its neighbours in origin, values and character. This *narod* was considered to be the very foundation of the nation and a leitmotif of Ukrainian historical development. Meaningful attributions of agency to such a collective entity as a 'people' de-emphasized the notion of the individual as a historical agent, including the role of statesmen and politicians.

Ukrainian historiography, therefore, endorsed a 'nationalizing discourse' that was replete with schemata, scripts and narratives, together with myths that created an image of a people, its national culture and values, as well as its institutions and expectations, that had been effectively thwarted by an enemy tsarist and Russian colonialism. This alternative to the official scholarship inherently denounced the abuse of tsarist power and domination, implying a diffuse notion of resistance. The problematic notion of being a colonized and stateless entity, with an underdeveloped national identity and consciousness, when tied to the salutary idea of undoing this state of affairs, meant a problem-/solution-oriented scholarship. Not only was this historiography 'concerned' and instrumentalist, but many of the social scientists – such as Mykola Hrushevs'kyi, for example – engaged in partisan political activities, and even held government posts when an independent Ukrainian polity came into existence at the beginning of the twentieth century.<sup>9</sup>

## Ukrainian Historiography as Social Knowledge: the Pre-Soviet Stage

Ukrainian scholarship was institutionalized quite rapidly by the different, short-lived, independent Ukrainian political regimes of the 1917-20 period. A government-sponsored Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was established in 1919. It and the universities emerged as the official knowledge-bearing institutions, supplementing the pre-World War I private academic/educational organizations. The humanities and the nascent social sciences witnessed a rapid development, primarily within the Academy's Historical-Philosophical and Socio-Economic Branches (*viddily*). The scope and methods of these disciplines allowed, among other things, for an *ukrainoznavstvo* mind-set in the conduct of scholarship on things Ukrainian. With the demise of an independent statehood and the advent of the Soviet regime in Ukraine, émigré scholars, along with those from the now Polish part of Ukraine, established a system of learned societies and higher-education institutions. These were designed to further scholarship begun earlier, but now being pursued in émigré conditions. Ukrainian humanities as well as the emerging social sciences witnessed a development within the confines of these academies. The scholarship that was produced in the realm of historiography continued within the established mental maps, schemata, scripts and myths. The very notion of the legitimacy of an independent Ukrainian statehood was never an issue in this scholarship. The issue was rather why independence had been lost. After all, the Soviet regime was perceived by the Ukrainian émigré public intellectuals as a Russian imposition. In the inter-war years, learned scholarship outside of Ukraine was found in numerous civil-society sites. For example, the Ukrainian Sociological Institute was set up in Vienna in 1919; the Ukrainian Free University was established in the same city in 1921, but later transferred to Prague. The Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw was organized in 1928; the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin appeared in 1929; the Ukrainian Historical-Philological Society of 1928 was Prague-based; the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute was set up in Pödebrady in 1932 and the Ukrainian Mohylo-Mazepian Academy of Sciences was founded in Warsaw in 1938. In addition, there was the already existing Shevchenko Scientific Society in L'viv. However, after the first world war the Polish authorities restricted its knowledge-generating activities.

## The Institution of Ukrainian Social Knowledge in the Early Soviet Era

The institutionalization of scholarship in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR) underwent a substantial evolution. The Ukrainian Academy of Sci-

ences, which existed under this name from 1918 to 1921, was renamed during the 1921-36 period as the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and finally as the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR. It retained this appellation until the demise of the USSR. During the first decade of the regime it operated as a scholarly body that was quite independent of the public authorities. This establishment, with no Western European equivalent, had the power to determine the cognitive structures and standards for scholarship in the humanities and the social sciences. Even though, over time, the Academy would eventually lose a portion of this prerogative to the political authorities, it would always remain the Soviet Ukrainian centre for co-ordinating research. This institutional peculiarity meant that the Academy would largely pre-empt the role of Soviet Ukrainian universities in the knowledge-generating domain. In order to rein-in the Academy, the authorities first set up an ideologically rival institution in 1922. The Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism, but especially its Department (*kafedra*) of Ukrainian history, generated quasi-academic social knowledge on things Ukrainian. This politically-coloured social knowledge rivalled that produced by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Government pressure also contributed to the demise of pre-Soviet Ukrainian academic institutional pluralism. The Historical Society of Nestor the Chronicler and the Kyiv Archeographic Commission were integrated into the Academy structures in 1921, and the Ukrainian Scientific Society was merged with it in 1923.

The 1920s were definitely the high point in the development of Soviet Ukrainian social sciences and humanities. This was made possible because of the official party-state nationality policy which favoured 'indigenization' (*korinizatsia*). Moscow instituted this policy in the non-Russian republics, because the regime felt that it lacked sufficient support there. The aim of 'indigenization' was to help the Soviet regime 'take root' among the non-Russians. One of the means used was to foster the development of non-Russian culture and their knowledge-making institutions. In Ukraine, the policy became known as 'Ukrainization' (*ukrainizatsia*). This policy acted, among other things, as an incentive for émigré scholars, for example Mykola Hrushevs'kyi, to return to Ukraine and to become involved in the development of Ukrainian scholarship in general and Ukrainian studies in particular. Ukrainian social knowledge was constructed in various institutions. The most important of them was the Historical-Philological Branch of the Academy. During the Ukrainization interval, this branch, with its 39 commissions and adjunct institutions, played the leading role in fostering fundamental research on Ukrainian issues. The pinnacle of its accomplishments was during the 1924-28 period. The key institutions of the branch were the Chairs of Ukrainian Studies in Kyiv and Kharkiv. The Socio-Economic Branch, with its emphasis on economics, demography, sociology and legal studies, was also important. It allowed for the development of the emerging social sciences, and

the production of a country-specific social knowledge, based on Ukrainian socio-cultural knowledge. Ukrainization effectively meant that the broad *ukrainoznavstvo* approach became a mechanism for integrating the humanities and the social sciences into the mainstream.

Diversified historiographical schools appeared during this era of enterprise in Ukrainization and Ukrainian studies. The previous 'populist' or cultural school, and the 'statist' one, witnessed further development. A certain degree of convergence occurred between them. Socio-economic, historical-legal and Marxist schools facilitated the process. Yet this highly pluralist historiography had one factor in common. All schools of thought acknowledged the notion of a singular and linear national historical development as constituting an undisputed social fact. The authorization of this concept meant that all Ukrainian cultural, social, nationhood, political and statehood issues, past and present, could be legitimately analysed as being unequivocally nationally idiosyncratic. The attendant historiographical schemata, narrative scripts and myths, which took this peculiarity for granted, were not a contentious issue, as in tsarist times. The political spin-off of the scholarly accomplishments and social knowledge of the 1920s was that they were instrumental in helping to consolidate not only a horizontal-national Ukrainian identity and national consciousness, but also a horizontal political sense of belonging. Thus, during the Ukrainization era, the social sciences and the humanities ministered not only to the forging of an 'ethnic nation', but also to the construction of a 'civic nation'.<sup>10</sup>

## The Demise of Early Soviet-Era Ukrainian Social Knowledge

The advent of Stalinism contributed towards an assimilationist nationality policy and the condemnation of Ukrainization. The national revival of the 1920s was terminated. From 1929 on, the independent regime of the Academy of Sciences was ended. It was transformed into a regional branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, with limited power and resources. In addition, the entire structure, all-Union and Ukrainian, was made subservient to the political agendas of the regime. The cognitive structures and the social knowledge produced in the 1920s by the Historical-Philological Branch of the Ukrainian Academy were condemned for having fostered a social knowledge allegedly coloured by an ideology of 'bourgeois nationalism'. In fact, all of the Ukrainian studies of the Ukrainization era, but especially historiography, were explicitly singled out as having actually contributed towards some purported Ukrainian separatist movement, intent on seceding from the USSR. The Historical-Philological Branch, as well as most of the Branch commissions, were liquidated in 1930. What remained was absorbed into the remaining Socio-Economics Branch, until it,

too, was abolished in 1934. Totally new and much more constricted structures appeared in 1936. The History, Philosophy and Law, and Economics Branches, but also Literature and Language, were lumped together as social sciences, and were placed under the auspices of a new Social Science Section (*seksiya*) of the Academy. Nevertheless, there was no room in the Ukrainian social sciences for sociology or political science. These were excluded on ideological grounds as being 'bourgeois' in nature. The once rival Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism, with its Marxist-Leninist frameworks and social knowledge, was also condemned for having produced 'bourgeois nationalist' scholarship in Ukrainian studies. This institute was first transformed, in 1931, into the All-Ukrainian Association of Marxist-Leninist Scientific Research Institutes, and then in 1936 it ceased to exist as a separate entity. It was incorporated into the History Branch of the Social Science Section of the Academy. With the Soviet annexation of Western Ukraine, the Shevchenko Scientific Society which had been established there in the nineteenth century was abolished in 1940 and dissolved into the structures of the Academy. The newly established History Branch of the Academy was therefore an amalgam of the remnants of numerous pre-existing institutions and commissions. It was but a pale version of the former Historical-Philological Branch, as most of its research associates were arrested and executed for allegedly subscribing to the ideologically disavowed mind-set of Ukrainian 'bourgeois nationalism'.<sup>11</sup>

During World War II the Ukrainian social sciences were enjoined to produce 'applied' research deemed helpful in the war effort. This was intertwined with a policy that allowed for a restricted preoccupation with Ukrainian topics. However, at the end of the war, even these lacklustre studies were also assigned the epitaph of 'bourgeois nationalism'. This contributed to the loss in the social sciences, and in the social knowledge that was generated by this field of knowledge, of virtually all national characteristics and content. But while real Ukrainian scholarship was being eradicated in Soviet Ukraine, it continued outside of the USSR. For example, the originally Prague-based Ukrainian Free University was re-established in West Germany. The Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences was first set up in the same country but later transferred to the USA. Branches of a renewed Shevchenko Scientific Society re-emerged in Western Europe, the USA and Canada. In addition to these and other émigré institutions, Ukrainian studies centres came into being within the confines of western institutions of higher learning, such as, for example, the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, at the University of Alberta. These academic bodies allowed the continuation and development of Ukrainian social sciences and humanities, including historiography.

As to the institutional aspects of Soviet Ukrainian scholarship, the Academy was subject to a complicated system of controls and supervision. These institu-

tional arrangements seriously hampered the development of the social sciences and social knowledge. Not only was the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR subordinated to the USSR Academy of Sciences, but it was simultaneously placed under the UkSSR Council of Ministers, as well as under the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). It, and not the universities or other institutes of higher education (VUZy), continued as the centre of social-scientific scholarship. The regime favoured 'applied' social research over basic research. This was in order to further its political agenda, even though this social knowledge was but a simulacrum of reality. In fact, it was of little 'practical' value, and lacked academic rigour. The quality of Soviet Ukrainian scholarship also suffered from its isolation from the methodological developments and innovations in the outside world. Unlike in the Russian case, the Ukrainian social sciences were constantly enjoined to be vigilant for manifestations of 'bourgeois nationalism'. Until the demise of the USSR, the Social Science Section of the Academy continued to supervise an amorphous domain of social sciences, which covered the History Branch and Philosophy and Law as well as the Literature, Languages and Fine Arts Branches.<sup>12</sup>

## The Specifics of Soviet Ukrainian Historiography as Social Knowledge

The peculiar Soviet social science regime that was instituted after the demise of Ukrainization continued with few 'liberalizing' intervals until the advent of glasnost in the late 1980s. As public policies and scholarship were closely intertwined in the former USSR, the CPSU imposed all-Union directives on the social sciences, and the CPU layered on additional directives specifically relevant to the Ukrainian social sciences. The framework established by the party was meant to be a 'system of significance' designed to control the activities of the social scientists. As such, the scheme laid down rules according to which the social world was to be made intelligible. Methodological positions in the Soviet Ukrainian social sciences were simultaneously political arguments intended to produce an authoritative, 'bureaucratic' and 'politically correct' knowledge. The top-down approach relied on new schemata, narrative scripts, signs and symbols, as well as political myths.

There was also a specific form of discourse in the Soviet social sciences. It reinforced the framework and the bureaucratic form of knowledge itself. The discourse was an 'officialesé' and encoded *langue de bois* of power. It emphasized the idea of a total textuality of reality. Only the texts produced by Soviet social scientists were considered to contain an 'authoritative' and an 'authentic' account of reality. There was little concern about whether these texts corre-

sponded to the 'empirical reality' of the real world or not. No concern was shown as to the possibility of textualism distorting reality. This stereotyped language, with its referential signs, symbols and myths, created a social knowledge that was therefore a mere simulacrum of reality. In that respect it contributed towards a curious 'power of emptiness' of the social sciences. Employing the technique of a variety of binary opposites, the Soviet social science discourse actually transformed the social sciences themselves into a 'game'. Nevertheless, it was possible for social scientists to learn ways to manipulate this discourse so as to indicate, to those steeped in the *langue de bois*, disagreements with the top-down imposed frames, interpretations, and so on. This would eventually allow for the development of alternative ways of looking at the social facts, and even frames of analysis, while giving the appearance of conforming to the directives concerning the social sciences, the 'officialese' language and the textual simulation of reality. To sum up, the official cognitive structure of Soviet social science and social knowledge contained normative, explanatory, prescriptive and emotive elements, even though the entire enterprise was divorced from socio-cultural knowledge.<sup>13</sup>

Soviet social cognizance resorted to the repeated restatement of regime-invented 'general tendencies' and 'objective laws' (*zakonomirnoŝti*) allegedly governing socio-historical development, with no concern for proving or disproving them. These apparently Soviet but essentially Russocentric formulations ignored the peculiarities of the non-Russian nations comprising the USSR. In addition, structural determinism and a fixation on collectivities pre-empted a centring on agency and the individual. Not only was the Soviet political regime involved in the politics of social science knowledge, but it also held a monopoly in determining the status of the social scientists. Positions and privileges were distributed along regime-established rules and norms. The above-described institutional arrangements of scholarship ensured a close proximity of the social scientists to the party state apparatus. Thus the Soviet knowledge regime, its cognitive frames and social knowledge itself embodied politics and power relations. The social sciences were claimed to be 'scientific', and 'objective', because, and only because, they supposedly reflected 'class positions' and 'party-mindedness' (*partiinst*) as determined by the CPSU. This notion of 'scientism' had absolutely nothing in common with Western social science notions of 'objectivity' and 'disinterested' inquiry. Consequently, according to the instrumentalist stipulations of Soviet social science, social scientists were expected, among other things, to uphold and defend the party, the regime and the territorial integrity of the USSR as a state.<sup>14</sup>

Most of the directives in the social sciences were applicable to historiography. Aware of its potential power, Soviet authorities placed much emphasis on harnessing and controlling historiography. Ukrainian historiography was singled out as being potentially disruptive of the system. All of Ukrainian scholarship, including historiography of the Ukrainization period, was declared to be not

only 'bourgeois nationalist' in nature, but actually conducive to political separatism from the USSR. That is why so much effort was put into undoing the 'nationalizing discourse' of the previous eras, and diligently supervising present-day scholarship. The idea of a singular Ukrainian historical development and the accompanying national solidarity myths were simply reviled. Having condemned the particular nature of Ukrainian social sciences, a standard scheme was imposed in 1934 on non-Russian historiography. However, this total regimentation became fully operational only after the second world war. The CPSU and the CPU directives indicated how Ukrainian history, society and polity ought to be conceptualized; which events, facts, persons and institutions were politically 'acceptable' and which were not. The newly imposed premise specified that Ukrainian socio-historical development was an integral component of Russian development, and that this had been the case even before Ukraine became a part of the Tsarist Empire.<sup>15</sup>

This social science frame was predicated on a new assimilationist nationality policy. The social sciences were to transmute the nationality policy and other directives into social knowledge. This was designed to help undo past scholarly contributions, especially those of the 1920s, in the realm of Ukrainian nation- and state-building. The partiality of the cognitive structure was crucial in determining what constituted a Ukrainian national 'historical memory' acceptable to the regime, and what myths, symbols and icons were politically opportune. The social sciences were expected to contribute towards 'social engineering' by establishing which Ukrainian social facts were to be selectively underlined and which ones were to be ignored, omitted from the collective memory or even deliberately falsified. The Soviet version of the 'amelioration' of Ukrainian society through the social sciences paradoxically meant that the social sciences would now help to 'de-construct' the sense of national belonging, so as to produce a people lacking a distinct horizontal identity. Social cognizance was to contribute towards the transformation of the population of Ukraine into a new horizontal 'imagined community', that of the 'Soviet people' (*radyanskyi narod*). In addition, this process would also soft-pedal Soviet Ukrainian vertical-political identity. On the contrary, it stressed exclusively an all-Union vertical-political belonging. A cluster of signs, symbols and myths, such as the 'Soviet homeland', 'Soviet fatherland', 'Soviet patriotism', 'Soviet way of life', and the like, were to accompany this Soviet-style 'nation- and state-building'. A 'drawing together' (*zblyzhennya*) of the peoples of the USSR was expected to occur, with Russian as their 'second native language' (*druha ridna mova*).<sup>16</sup>

In order to arrive at this assimilationist end-state, the party directives made it imperative for the Soviet Ukrainian social sciences to develop a politically induced myth of an alleged common ancestry for Ukrainians, Russians and Belorussians. This was the notion of the *drevnoruska narodnist'* ('old Rus' peo-

ple'). Yet, simultaneously, this alleged common Slavic proto-nation or people was often used to mean only 'old Russian'. The principal intimation of this myth was that in contradistinction to the Ukrainian nation, the Russians enjoyed a direct lineage from this *drevnorus'ka narodnist'*. In addition, the genesis of the modern Russian nation was claimed to have preceded that of the Ukrainian one. Consequently, the social sciences were required to subscribe to the idea that the Russian nation was more 'fulfilled' and 'accomplished' than the Ukrainian community. In simplified and vulgarized terminology, the Russians were assigned the role of an 'elder brother' (*starshyi brat*) throughout history. Furthermore, the Russian state was conceptualized as being an immediate successor of the Kyivan Rus' state. At no time could Ukraine claim such political institutional lineage or legitimacy. Finally, this myth of Ukrainian evolution from a single form of communality – that of the 'old Rus' people' – to that of the 'Soviet people' was allegedly governed by one unique and overriding goal: that of an 'eternal and inviolable reunification' (*vozyednannya*) of the Ukrainians with Russia, even when they had become a distinct nation.<sup>17</sup>

This mental frame left no room for any notion of an independent Ukrainian statehood. The subject was made politically taboo by the insistence that the non-Russians, Ukrainians included, had given it up, by entering voluntarily into the Tsarist Empire. This idea was partially covered by the myth of the salutary 'lesser evil' formula. By being absorbed by the Tsarist Empire the non-Russians had supposedly been spared from being incorporated by neighbouring states. The positive aspect of belonging to the empire was that the Russians allegedly 'took care' of the non-Russians. In addition, the myth claimed that, of all the peoples, only the Ukrainians had entered into an exceptionally close melding with Russia. The others had simply 'united' (*obyednannya* or *priyednannya*) with the Russians. In the case of the Ukrainians, it was a 'return to the fold', one of a total 'reunification' (*vozyednannya*). A supposedly 'unbreakable' and 'perpetual' bond had developed between the Ukrainians and the Russians, thereby precluding even any thought of Ukrainian secession. In order to reinforce this point, Stalinist historiography reviled, and in the process de-legitimized, past Ukrainian statehoods, such as for example the seventeenth-century Cossack Hetmanate, Zaporizhs'ka Sich, and the 1917-20 polity. Social sciences were enjoined either to avoid the subject of past pro-independence movements, or to condemn the secessionist attempts of the early eighteenth and twentieth centuries.<sup>18</sup>

According to this official prism for visualizing Ukrainian historical development, the Ukrainians were also presented as having gained from their association with Russian culture, meaning that an 'elder brother' myth was also applicable to cultural matters. In order to make this acceptable it was acknowledged that the Ukrainians were in fact subject only to tsarist, but not to Russian, political and cultural colonialism and oppression. It was denied that the economic colonial-

ization of Ukraine had ever existed at all. This additional dimension explained that since Ukraine formed an integral part of the centralized imperial economy it had benefited from this situation. Furthermore, Ukraine was claimed to have experienced generally positive economic consequences, for the Tsarist Empire had effectively facilitated Ukraine's integration into the world economy. The implication was that an independent Ukraine would have been much worse off – the so-called 'lesser evil' formula. Paradoxically, the integration of the tsarist economy itself into the world economy was decried for having limited Russian independence.<sup>19</sup>

### The Emergence of an Alternative Perspective in Soviet Ukrainian Social Knowledge

The partial de-Stalinization that began in the mid 1950s and continued until the early 1970s loosened the general political regimentation of Ukraine, and led to a mild 'national revival'. Even though the bulk of this renewal was oriented towards a preoccupation with the issue of the demise of the Ukrainian language during the Stalinist era, it spilled over onto the humanities and the social sciences. Politicians, public intellectuals and academics ridiculed the pathetic state of Ukrainian scholarship in general and historiography in particular. Ukrainian social knowledge was said to have become entirely 'a-national', to the point where the national history was a 'history devoid of history'. However, unlike in the 1920s, when the majority of Ukrainian scholars in the humanities and social sciences rejected the official tsarist schemes, and turned towards the development of cognitive frames that were rooted in national socio-cultural knowledge, this did not occur in the 1960s. It appears that Soviet political socialization had been successful. In addition, the fresh memory of Stalinism and the regime-specific institutionalization and ideologization of the social science profession all worked in favour of the status quo. Consequently, two unequal groupings emerged in the humanities and the social sciences, during this political 'thaw' and 'national revival'. A comparable differentiation came into existence in the realm of historiography.<sup>20</sup>

The majority continued their position as 'detractors' of anything Ukrainian. They subscribed to the notion of the Ukrainian historical process as found on the Stalinist mental map. These detractors insisted on the need to re-impose rigid administrative controls over the academic institutional structures, so as to weed out any alternative reflections on historiography. This majority orientation maintained that the main task of the social sciences was to be instrumental in supporting the political regime. That is why the detractors stressed that the social sciences in general, and historiography in particular, had to continue to subscribe to the

principle of *partiinist*. Vigilance was to be shown by the social scientists in uncovering manifestations of what was called 'objectivism' (*obyektivizm*) and 'revisionism', as well as of Ukrainian 'bourgeois nationalism'. All of these features were claimed to be evident in the scholarship of those attempting to reassess Ukrainian history, culture, politics and society. In addition, Soviet Ukrainian social sciences, and especially historiography, were to be instrumental in disclaiming and repudiating the cognitive maps and social knowledge of both Western 'bourgeois' scholars and Ukrainian émigré 'bourgeois nationalist falsifiers'.<sup>21</sup>

The minority orientation in historiography was that of the 'rehabilitators' of things Ukrainian. They decried the methodological poverty of the social sciences and the lack of a relational, dialectical and especially a 'concrete' (*konkretnyi*) contextual approach in social knowledge in general. *Partiinist* was rejected not only as hindering the emergence of a normal and objective social science, but also as stifling the creativity of the social scientists. A plurality of approaches, cognitive frames and even schools of thought was advocated in Ukrainian historiography. The imposed – Stalinist – standard scheme for depicting the Ukrainian historical process was repudiated for its Russian ethnocentrism. Emphasis was now to be placed on the so-called 'concrete' circumstances of Ukrainian historical development. This Aesopic formulation indicated the need to shift from an over-emphasis on structure in social knowledge to some recognition of agency. The social scientists were expected to discover specifically Ukrainian 'law-like regularities' (*zakonomirnosti*) governing Ukrainian development. Failure to accomplish this was said to invoke a future 'judgement of history' on Ukrainian social knowledge. This effectively meant that the hitherto falsified and truncated image of nationhood was totally unacceptable and that a continuation of this endeavour would be seen by future social scientists as unacceptable. The rehabilitators insisted not only on improving the quality of scholarship – they were also concerned that this renewed scholarship, especially in the realm of historiography, ought to contribute to the construction, or the reconstruction, of collective Ukrainian horizontal national identities, damaged by the Stalinist scheme. In this respect, the rehabilitators pursued a 'nationalizing discourse' with a 'national project' in mind. Finally, they may have had a more ambitious design concerning the renewed historiography. They claimed that it would eventually come to constitute a kind of Ukrainian 'political thought' (*politychna dumka*).<sup>22</sup>

The rehabilitative historiography proceeded to resurrect much of the previously acquired social knowledge, including nineteenth-century and early Soviet-era Ukrainian historiography. This historiography insisted on several features essential to the Ukrainian developmental process. The Ukrainian national historical process in general, and nation-building in particular, was claimed to have been a 'bottom-up' one, with culture and political ideas playing a primary role. This was in contradistinction to the allegedly 'top-down', state-centred Russian

process. The other singular Ukrainian characteristic was the role of 'national liberation' in Ukrainian historical development. It was claimed that this feature was absent in the Russian case. Finally, unlike in its northern neighbour, there was assumed to have been little class differentiation in Ukraine. This alleged specificity of the Ukrainians implied the idea of national unity. This singular feature of the Ukrainians was then contrasted to the supposed lack of this attribute in the class-ridden Russians. These 'counter myths' debunked the Stalinist ones. Other rejected myths included the 'leading role' assigned to the Russians, their 'elder brother' status, the 'lesser evil', and 'eternal friendship'. The questioning of the 'common origin' myth and that of 'reunification' was rather more calculating. The entire compilation of rehabilitative counter-myths was implied to offer a more 'authentic' cognizance, eminently in line with Ukrainian cultural knowledge. It was thus insinuated that official Soviet social knowledge provided a falsified notion of reality. The historiography's connoted group rights and a community's historical entitlement to culture, as well as to territory, were of the utmost importance.<sup>23</sup>

Ukrainian national liberation was depicted as constituting the very essence of Ukrainian development. This was the case because all Ukrainian history was claimed to have been oriented towards overcoming the political, social, cultural and economic colonial situation imposed on it by its neighbours, especially tsarist Russia. National liberation was considered to have been a truly holistic national experience which united the entire people. This blatant disregard of class analysis was rationalized on the grounds of a supposedly weak class distinction, as well as foreign domination. Hence the idea of a supposedly holistic and undifferentiated 'spirit of the people' (*narodnist*) which imbued the entire nation and its political activity. The notion of *narodnist* implied a latent myth of a superior status for Ukrainian culture, compared with Russian culture. This populist perspective was contrasted to the role of 'great men' in the Russian case. The key aspect of the idea of national liberation was that it allowed the rehabilitators to raise the question as to the end-state of this process. Both Ukrainian nationhood and statehood were presented as having been achieved at different points in time, by means of national liberation. This was the closest that the rehabilitative historiography would come to the question of the outcome of the process of national liberation and the issue of secession. The historiography also hinted at the inherently Ukrainian features of Kyivan Rus'. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Cossack statehood (*derzhavnist*) received special attention. Tsarist policies were blamed for the demise of the Cossack polities. There were ambiguous formulations as to the achievement of national liberation with the establishment of the independent statehood of 1917-20, and to some extent the Soviet state that supplemented it. All were implied to have been the end products of a long national liberation process. However, when the Soviet regime was discussed,

emphasis was placed primarily on the positive consequences of the Ukrainization era. In a sense, the rehabilitators brought to the fore historical grievances about the lack of specifically Ukrainian political institutions, as well as demands for rectificatory justice.<sup>24</sup>

## The Return to 'Normalcy' in Soviet Ukrainian Social Knowledge

In the early 1970s this limited 'national revival' was put to an end. Scholars associated with the revival and the rehabilitative historiography were purged from academic institutions. Not only were they dismissed, but many were also debarred from publishing. 'Bourgeois nationalist' deviation, 'methodological errors' and the 'idealization of the past' were again detected in the Ukrainian social sciences, especially in historiography. The very notion of Ukrainian national liberation as a normative concept was discredited. Care was taken to condemn the role of the Ukrainian Cossacks in this process, and the Cossack statehood itself was ridiculed. The rehabilitative historiography was also denounced for alleged idealization of the acquisitions of nineteenth-century and early Soviet Ukrainian scholarship. According to the detractors, who now fully controlled the social sciences, the rehabilitators had committed a most serious error by failing to extol all the advantages for Ukraine of its reunification with Russia. A neo-Stalinist frame was again re-imposed on all of Ukrainian historiography. The nature of the ever politically sensitive idea of Ukrainian historical development was now more restricted in scope. What emerged was an image of a process lacking any national singularity – at best it was an evolution from the 'old Rus' people', via the 'reunification' with the Russians, to the 'Soviet people'.<sup>25</sup>

The dominant regime of social cognizance that was re-introduced was not only oriented towards scholarship, but was also instrumental in the further alteration of Ukrainian horizontal-national identity. The Russocentric schemata, narrative scripts, myths, signs and symbols inherent in official social knowledge were apparently internalized by a good portion of the general public. This contributed towards a weakening of their sense of national belonging and contributed towards liminality and a somewhat colonized mentality. This social knowledge was instrumental in eliminating significant portions of the national 'we' from Ukrainian collective memory. The remaining fragments of the national 'we' were subject to 'a-Ukrainian', if not 'anti-Ukrainian' interpretations. The end result of all of this was that by the late 1980s a sizeable portion of the Ukrainian population, including the eponymous one, lacked an unproblematic and widely shared national identity. Some inhabitants of Ukraine regarded themselves as being simultaneously Ukrainian and Russian. Others had already

undergone an identity shift from Ukrainian to 'Soviet people'. If it is assumed that a sense of collective and personal identity leads to the articulation of certain political values and priorities, the weakly developed national 'belongingness' helped create a population that was characterized by an unarticulated sense of politicized national identity. The very idea of Ukraine's secession from the USSR was probably unfathomable for most of the 'a-national' inhabitants of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.<sup>26</sup>

This state of affairs continued in the social sciences and in historiography until the late 1980s. However, the rehabilitative historiographical scholarship did not disappear entirely during the 1970s and 1980s. It continued to exist, but the subscribing social scientists who were allowed to publish were extremely careful in their formulations so as to avoid being labelled 'bourgeois nationalists'. Much of their work consisted in publishing historical Ukrainian archival material. Little annotated, it was intent on having the 'facts speak for themselves'. This oblique process of rehabilitating Ukrainian culture and history was understood only by those initiated in this approach. This rehabilitative endeavour was also a tacit way of disagreeing with the official rhetoric, while going through the motions of apparently following it. The Aesopian language used to dissent from the dominant paradigm, and from social knowledge that denied any national singularity, stressed that the 'Ukrainian social fact' had been 'insufficiently understood' and thus 'required further study'. The nature of the Ukrainian historical process, the connection between Kyivan Rus' and the Ukrainian nation and the essence of the seventeenth- and eighteenth century Cossack polity exemplified these allegedly 'insufficiently understood' aspects of Ukrainian nationhood and statehood. Therefore, the impact of the rehabilitative scholarship was not totally lost. Its knowledge and 'nationalizing discourse' inspired a limited audience, that of the Ukrainian public intellectuals. Some of them operated within the political system, while others were in the dissident movement. Most dissidents extolled the idea of the universal human condition, human rights and justice. A segment of this movement would undergo an evolution from cultural rights to concerns with political autonomy, and even the idea of secession from the USSR. This radicalization of attitude actually occurred during the 1970s, a period of most severe repression. It was then that the dissidents became engrossed with the subject of Ukrainian 'martyrdom' and national 'ethnocide' and, in the process, evolved a lachrymose genre.<sup>27</sup>

## Political Changes in Soviet Ukraine

Ukraine demurred as one of the last bastions in the USSR opposed to perestroika (*perebudova* in Ukrainian). The authorities in Kyiv made sure that, compared

with other parts of the USSR, *glasnost* (*hlasnist'* in Ukrainian) and *demokratyzatsiya* were slow to arrive in Ukraine. However, the way the USSR political centre mishandled the Chernobyl disaster, as well as the revelations of Stalinist atrocities in Ukraine, contributed towards a general dissipation of Soviet legitimacy in Ukraine. Notwithstanding, the CPU remained passive in the light of these developments. In fact the party continued to harass societal actors advocating transformation, transparency and democracy. This stance contributed towards the exit of many public intellectuals from the CPU. When the regime did reluctantly allow non-communist civic associations and cultural fronts, public intellectuals along with dissidents forged a national democratic movement. But unlike the situation in other Soviet republics, the CPU originally refused to come to an understanding with the national democrats.

An alteration in party policy would become evident only after a leadership reshuffles in Kyiv in the late 1980s. The new leadership finally accepted *perestroika*. However, the issue of what was to be done about the erosion of legitimacy and power at the USSR centre, and a similar loss of power and legitimacy in Ukraine, badly divided the CPU. The majority – that is, the 'orthodox' or 'conservative' faction – either refused to face the problem, or remained inactive. The 'liberal' portion of the CPU nomenclature came to the realization that, if left unchecked, the situation would inevitably undermine their privileged position. With the overriding preoccupation of holding onto power, the 'liberal' faction focused on the idea that the UkSSR was not getting its 'fair share'. In practice this implied the advocacy of a greater 'concern' with Ukrainian issues and policies. This furthering of the 'liberal' faction's own agenda inevitably challenged the USSR centre. In the process of flexing their political muscle, these 'national communists' proceeded to appropriate portions of the national democrats' concern with the Ukrainian 'national question'.<sup>28</sup>

## A New Reassessment of Ukrainian Social Knowledge

It was in this climate of democratization and transparency that a mildly rehabilitative viewpoint manifested itself among public intellectuals in general, as well as in the social sciences. This attitude would again, as in the 1960s, decry the sorry state of Ukrainian historiography. According to the public intellectuals who subscribed to this orientation, the very image of Ukraine had become totally diluted and unfocused. The public intellectuals claimed that no construction of a positive collective or individual national identity was possible as long as the institutionalized Ukrainian collective memory was presented according to the official Soviet approach. Their main contention was that this rhetoric was a-Ukrainian, if not anti-Ukrainian, in nature. Furthermore, it was claimed that individual or

collective national identity-building could not flourish if Ukrainian history was presented as but a series of gaping 'blank spots' (*bili plyamy*). Counter-myths were suggested to displace the imposed ones.

For example, the notion of a common Ukrainian-Russian development was to be replaced by the idea of a singular and specifically Ukrainian historical process. This echoed earlier rehabilitative formulations. The 'brotherhood' myth was to be exchanged for one stressing the adverse nature of Russian, tsarist and Soviet polities. Closely connected to this idea were the notions of the 'martyrdom' and 'ethnocide' of the Ukrainian nation, which had allegedly been brought about by Russian and Soviet imperialism and colonialism. The 'old Rus' people' myth was questioned as Ukrainian national roots were traced to the Kyivan Rus'. There was a manifestation of a historical grievance caused by the loss of the Cossack Hetmanate and *Zaporizhs'ka Sich*. The goals of the seventeenth-century Ukrainian association with Russia were said to have been limited in scope and not to have included the idea of 'reunification'. More significantly, it was claimed that Russia had failed to respect this original, limited political alliance. In addition, the rehabilitative voices called for a reassessment of all the different past statehoods, including Kyivan Rus', the Cossack polities and the early twentieth-century independent regimes. Historical political figures such as, for example, Mazepa and Hrushevs'kyi, who had each pursued independence-seeking policies in their own era, were to be reinstated. There were even calls for the development of a specifically Ukrainian socio-humanities field of knowledge that would focus primarily on things Ukrainian.<sup>29</sup>

## Ukrainian Independence

Ukrainian independence came about almost as an unpredicted contingency of discreet Soviet political events. In the period immediately before independence, the 'national communists' made the UkSSR legislature their main political forum, as the CPU Politburo remained in the hands of the 'conservative communists'. With the help of a small group of national democrats, they proceeded to transform this institution into something resembling a real national parliament. In addition, the presidency of the Presidium of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet was made into a de facto presidency of the republic. The rhetoric justifying these institutional changes underlined the need for the UkSSR to attain greater latitude from the USSR centre. This CPU faction was crucial in having this institution adopt a law in 1989 making Ukrainian the official state language. Of more consequence was the July 1990 Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine. Basing themselves on the principle that Ukrainian sovereignty overrode all-Union sovereignty, the parliament and its presidency refused to sign the Union Treaty revised in 1991. The

'national communists' considered the new treaty unacceptable on account of its unjust centralism. At about this time, the UkSSR Supreme Soviet created a new political institution, that of the President of the UkSSR. This institution had the vested power to disregard all-Union legislation. Yet paradoxically, the Kyiv leadership's hesitant stance during the abortive August 1991 coup symbolized well the Ukrainian nomenclature's quandary. Until the very end of the USSR they remained torn between loyalty to the centre and the desire to assert the UkSSR's prerogatives. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the coup, the 'national communists' did manage to 'reinvent' themselves as a national 'party of power'.<sup>30</sup>

The principle of national determination, inherent in the rehabilitative nation-to-state model of Ukrainian development, was used by the national democrats to justify Ukrainian secession or, as they preferred to call it, Ukrainian 'national liberation'. Much of the national democrats' approach to things Ukrainian echoed the image of Ukraine as expounded both by Ukrainian historiography of the 1920s and by the rehabilitators of the 1960s. As for the 'national communists', the actual decision-makers at the time of independence, their rationalization of this act can be deduced from their pre-independence posture. It rested on the idea that the circumstances in which Ukraine found itself within the USSR were basically 'unjust'. The Ukrainian government therefore affirmed the right of a Soviet administrative unit to escape from an implied situation of injustice. The 'national communists' intertwined this idea of the 'state rights' of a Soviet ethno-administrative unit with those of the right of national self-determination, borrowed from the national democrats. This compounded apology for independence legitimized the self-interest of the 'national communists'. It also helped them to safeguard political power in their own hands. While the 'conservative' faction of the CPU remained indecisive, the 'national communists' proceeded with the August 1991 Declaration of Independence, an act overwhelmingly validated by a nation-wide referendum in December 1991. The referendum, as a political act, gave popular legitimization to Ukrainian secession. Notwithstanding the endorsement of independence, a sizeable portion of the population who voted for Ukrainian independence did so not as an affirmation of their politicized Ukrainian national identity, but as a manifestation of their economic wants and needs. A separate Ukrainian polity was perceived as being more capable of delivering economic benefits than the USSR.<sup>31</sup>

## Contemporary Social Knowledge and Politics

Since the newly independent state lacked proper myths, signs and symbols, as the Soviet ones were discredited and debunked, the government resurrected signs and symbols that had until very recently been derided, ridiculed, con-

demned and forbidden, as being allegedly Ukrainian 'bourgeois nationalist'. In declaring the anthem, the blue-and-yellow flag and the trident associated with the Ukrainian statehood of 1917-20 as national/state symbols, the public authorities established a symbolically effective myth of political continuity. The task of elaborating more malleable symbols of nationhood and statehood was left to public intellectuals. The denouement of this avocation was to be within the general context of what could be described as a 'top-down' induced governmental 'nationalizing project'. It was intent not only on ensuring institutional state-building, but also on inviting a national cultural revival that would comprise the propagation of the humanities and the social sciences, particularly historiography. The malleable symbols that were to be constructed by the public intellectuals would provide an additional legitimization for the new regime. The various pliant symbols of nationhood could also help to mould a common vision and to mobilize the population around agreed principles. Social knowledge containing mouldable symbols would, furthermore, aid in the transmutation of the Soviet-vintage, 'quasi' or 'virtual' statehood into a real one, as well as in the permutation of the Soviet-era nationhood, which was experiencing similar difficulties, into a genuine one. Social cognizance would thus help in the construction of both horizontal-national and vertical-political identities. There was a resemblance in all of this to the Ukrainian public intellectuals' mission during the long nineteenth century, the difference being that their undertaking then had been primarily one of ensuring a nation-to-state mutation, while in the context of an independent Ukraine it was a state-to-nation endeavour.<sup>32</sup>

Numerous reasons have so far impeded the accomplishment of the 'nationalizing project', the achievement of a genuine cultural revival, the development of scholarship, and the elaboration of a 'national ameliorative' standpoint. The emerging Ukrainian civil society has remained characterized by a 'flat landscape', with amorphous and weak societal associations, few of which have managed to promote a national revival or the renewal of social knowledge. The extremely serious and on-going governmental budgetary crisis has meant that the state has been incapable of providing a cultural renewal or a regeneration of scholarship. Instead of the cultural revival that was expected during the brief euphoria following independence, Ukraine has actually witnessed the reverse. The lack of professionalism in certain social science fields has remained a knotty point. For example, Soviet-era economists lacked proper preparation, and the professional training of the contemporary political scientist is wanting. Former advocates of 'scientific communism', as well as those working in the field of history of the USSR or the CPSU, publicists, and so on, have proclaimed themselves political scientists. This has had an adverse effect on the restitution of proper social scientific scholarship. A more serious issue has been the continuity of Soviet-era academic institutions with essentially detractive, Soviet-era research personnel, who basically still pos-

sess a Soviet-era mind-set. Few of the formerly dismissed knowledge-generating social scientists of the rehabilitative orientation are likely to be reintegrated into academic institutions. As for the Academy, despite its name changes – first to the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, in 1992, and then to the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, in 1994 – there have been few substantive changes in terms of its structure, direction or approach. Nevertheless, a handful of new institutes have been layered onto the old structure. The new institution-building is illustrated by the Institute of Archeography and Source Studies and the Institute of Oriental Studies. However, the Academy still remains the co-ordinating body for social science and humanities research, even though the universities are starting to affirm themselves in this domain. There are cases where individuals and even entire institutions have undergone some shifts in orientation, from ‘class analysis’ to a preoccupation with nationhood. For example, those social scientists who were formerly responsible for ‘uncovering’ alleged Ukrainian ‘bourgeois nationalist falsifications’ are today the advocates of Ukrainian ‘ethno-state studies’ (*etno-oderzhavoznavstvo*). The Institute of History of the CPSU, which throughout the post-war era spearheaded the detractive orientation outside of the Academy of Sciences, has now been renamed the Institute of Political and Ethnonational Studies and has been integrated into the Academy.<sup>33</sup>

Yet, in spite of all of this, it appears at first sight that Ukrainian scholarship has witnessed one of those ‘extraordinary’ moments in history that heralds a paradigm shift. For example, in much of the historiography there has been an overturning of Soviet-era misconceptions about nationhood as well as the now admitted, Soviet-era blatant deceptions concerning freedom, equality, fraternity of nations, etc. This move has been associated with the resurrection of past schemata, scripts and myths, as markers that make available a more ‘preferable’ sense of nationhood. The cognition frames and the social knowledge developed by nineteenth-century scholarship, the erudition of the 1920s, and émigré scholarship, appear to be today’s principal referentials. There have even been demands for the re-establishment of *ukrainoznavstvo* as an integrative discipline for the entire field of socio-humanities and even of ‘scientific nationalism’ as a method of scholarship.<sup>34</sup>

Nonetheless, on close reading there is little reason to speak of any paradigm shift. The rehabilitative-oriented humanities specialists and social scientists needed no change in mental maps. Their scholarship was and is in line with their cognitive structures. However, the problem lies with the majority of contemporary social scientists and those in the humanities. They were, after all, detractors in their orientation of the past. Some have remained openly so, others are more covert about it. An important contingent of public intellectuals have not altered their Soviet-vintage system of internalized acquired learning, for it has become something of a habitus for them. Numerous public intellectuals and researchers continue to grasp the world through their past cognitive systems. As in the past,

there is much reliance on formal schemes and a collage of quotes. The social knowledge that is produced has but a veneer of rehabilitative schemata, narratives, symbols, and so on. This simulated rehabilitative scholarship therefore retains Soviet-vintage discourse, even though the focus of this rhetoric has cosmetically shifted from class to nation.<sup>35</sup>

Today, consequently, there is still a detractive/rehabilitative type of confrontation evident among public intellectuals. The two distinct cognitive frames have produced types of scholarship that correspond to the assumptions and values of these referentials. Each of these approaches has a built-in 'concerned' point of view, as well as advocacy. The main subject of contention is not the re-assessment of the Soviet past. The nature of the present Ukrainian nation and its statehood are of prime concern. Debates concerning civic and ethnic nationhood issues spill over into the very idea of Ukrainian political independence. The current rehabilitators, even though they indulge in some re-analysis of the Soviet era, are really preoccupied with the advocacy and defence of political independence as an irreversible process. As for the detractors, they are not averse to the idea of undoing this political act, so as to return to arrangements that recall those of the past. Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose ...<sup>36</sup>

## Conclusion

Ukrainian social sciences emerged slowly in rather difficult circumstances. Early nineteenth-century developments were in a socio-humanities vein. Ukrainian studies of that time underlined history as a crucial field of public knowledge. Historical cognizance as social knowledge that was created by public intellectuals was grounded in cultural cognition. Consequently, this social cognition, with its narratives, discourses and myths, was readily acceptable to the Ukrainian community, for it was perceived as corresponding to community cultural knowledge. Ukrainian historiography as a cognitive-normative, explanatory, evaluative and argumentative endeavour was also a manifestation of experiential social knowledge about 'things Ukrainian'. It contributed towards the institutionalization of national memory, Ukrainian nation-building and Ukrainian independence-seeking thought and action.

The advent of the Soviet regime in Ukraine eventually put an end to this form of social knowledge. The Soviet social sciences instituted regime-imposed schemes, narratives and myths. The social knowledge that emerged was politically driven. The institutionalized memory that historiography, for example, offered as social knowledge was a regime-imposed one. Even though the politically governed, Soviet social science cognitive arrangements were essentially in the rationalist tradition, there was more to them. The Soviet hegemonic mental

frame and social knowledge tended also to combine abstract, non-representational expressions with 'matter-of-fact' concrete formulations. Eventually, an officially imposed scheme helped to confine the Soviet social scientists' cognizant capabilities concerning the analysis of the past, present and future of Soviet reality. Soviet social knowledge in general, and that of historiography in particular, was a form of 'bureaucratic scholarship'. Even though it was basically deductive, normative, evaluative and prescriptive, and attempted to be instrumental, it was a very peculiar phenomenon. In the last analysis, Soviet social knowledge offered no more than a simulacrum of social reality.

The instrumental aspect of Soviet social science was also quite particular. The social scientists were expected to produce knowledge, with its accompanying myths, that was supposed to reinforce the regime's legitimacy. Consequently, the know-how evolved by the Soviet Ukrainian social sciences explicitly or implicitly extolled the notion of the Ukrainian union, merger or amalgamation with its northern neighbour. This political amalgamation was extolled regardless of whether it was with the tsarist polity or the Soviet one. Soviet Ukrainian historiography was also enjoined to produce scholarship that would not concern itself with the sustenance and reinforcement of a specifically Ukrainian collective identity, outside the context of an all-Soviet one. In order to attain this objective, the official historiography was to truncate and scale down, if not denigrate, the individuality of Ukrainian nationhood and to tone down the thought of a discrete Ukrainian statehood. Ideas of any Ukrainian disaffiliation, separation, breaking away or secession were rebuked by this social knowledge.

Despite the regimented nature of Soviet Ukrainian social sciences, including historiography, some social scientists did break away from the dominant scheme, with its attendant political myths. The alternative mental map was based on past acquisitions of Ukrainian social knowledge, and displayed a high valuation of Ukrainian nationhood and statehood. It was adopted by social scientists intent on rehabilitating things Ukrainian, in contrast to the detractive role played by the official historiography. The social scientists of this mind-set did formulate a positive image of Ukrainianness. The rehabilitative historiography claimed that the detractive orientation was tendentious in its Russian centrism and, as such, was neither truthful nor accurate. Offering Ukrainian centrism, the rehabilitative historiography came to consider the Ukrainian *narod*, Ukrainian culture and national liberation as constituting the basic core of Ukrainianness. This historiography therefore offered a 'nationalizing discourse', aimed at promoting the notion of a singular Ukrainian development, and the idea of a distinct nationhood. At the same time, the rehabilitative historiography approached cautiously – and at times only implicitly – the question of Ukrainian political prerogatives. It stressed collective rights, the cultural self-preservation of a people, historical entitlement to a territory and nationhood, and rectificatory justice. The closest it

came to the idea of a distinct Ukrainian political entity was when this scholarship expressed the notion of an historical grievance for the lost Ukrainian political institutions of the past.

The essentially deductive, normative, evaluative, prescriptive and committed rehabilitative orientation did suffer periodic reversals and repressions. This partially explains why, by the time of Ukrainian independence in 1991, the rehabilitative social sciences were only a marginal force. The lack of a direct impact of this historiography on the general public may explain why, in that politically crucial time period, Ukraine did not possess a clear, unambiguous and widely shared national identity. In fact, there is little evidence that the official and dominant orientation in the social sciences had any direct bearing on Ukrainian independence. Not only did the official social scientists possess a detractive mind-set towards 'things Ukrainian', but they lacked a positive, policy-oriented instrumental attitude in the realm of public affairs. Instead, the entire bureaucratic social science establishment, as well as the individual social scientists, remained paralysed in the face of the political changes that were taking place in Ukraine. These social scientists were, with rare exceptions, taken unawares by the political events. They followed these events, or at best paralleled them, in the sense that they partially readjusted their rhetorical discourse. However, the Soviet Ukrainian social scientists were not really attuned to the social world or to the Ukrainian 'social fact'. They were prisoners of their carefully constructed and maintained simulacrum of the social world, which passed for social knowledge. Contrary to the official Soviet Ukrainian social sciences, which did not have any impact on the political transformations in Ukraine, the marginalized and often-repressed rehabilitative social knowledge orientation did. The political actions and policies of the political actors who established Ukrainian independence in 1991 were justified and legitimized by the acquisitions of the rehabilitative social knowledge. Therefore this social knowledge may be considered to have been at least a distant cause of Ukrainian independence in the 1990s. In this respect, it was not dissimilar to the impact that early twentieth-century Ukrainian social knowledge had on the Ukraine's first experience of independence in that century.

Today, the rehabilitative schemata, narrative scripts and myths have become commonplace, and enjoy official approval. However, despite the widespread usage of rehabilitative-type formulations, there is little evidence of a profound change in the mind-set of most social scientists. Having learned how to manipulate discourses in the Soviet era, many contemporary Ukrainian social scientists have changed their rhetoric only superficially. They have adopted the officially sponsored discourse, without divesting themselves of the former Soviet mode of thinking. All of this has contributed to the continuation of a basically Soviet style of scholarship, which carries only a veneer of the new, indicating the possibility of cognitive dissonance. This staying power of past social learning is rein-

forced by the continuity of academic institutional structures, and their staff. A 'bureaucratic' type of social scholarship is still evident, as is the close link between the public authorities and public intellectuals in general, and those in the humanities and the social sciences in particular. The political authorities have imposed on the social sciences the task of formulating policy-oriented social knowledge. This social knowledge is to be politically instrumental in ensuring Ukrainian nation- and state-building. Nonetheless, this venture of linking social knowledge with public policy has been greatly hindered by the general state of crisis in which Ukraine finds itself today. A disparate, traumatized and impoverished society may not be readily receptive or responsive to publicly created social knowledge, narratives, symbols or social engineering.

## Notes

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Note: The word Ukraine will be rendered in English without the definite article, as is the current standard practice. Ukrainian and Russian words are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system. Ukrainian names, when in Ukrainian, are transliterated as such (e.g. Kyiv). However, when a Ukrainian name appears in Russian, it is transliterated in Russian (e.g. Kiev).
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### *Ukrainian Social Knowledge and Secession*

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