

## Abstract

This is a work within the metaphysics of David Malet Armstrong (1926- ). In particular it concentrates on the role that partial identity has played in his system in supporting some necessary propositions. After a vast summarization of his system in the first chapter, I begin the second chapter by formalizing partial identity in its 'general form'. I show that the symmetry/asymmetry feature of partial identity should be taken as a part of the general form in order to present a better account of Armstrongian partial identity and the way it supports necessities. All of this can be grasped by studying the paradigm cases, i.e., resemblance between objects, out of which Armstrong has proposed his idea of partial identity. Moreover, I show that this modification helps us to give a better explanation of the necessary mutual exclusion in determinables. I continue this chapter by explaining Armstrong's new version of metaphysics. For this, I argue that if we are committed to the Armstrongian system, the application of the idea of partial identity to his new metaphysics is in tension with the modal system of S5. In fact, partial identity cannot ground the necessities he has appealed to in his new metaphysics. I tentatively suggest that the symmetric relation of 'going through' associated with the partial identity can ground the alleged necessities. More importantly, I argue that the symmetric relation here has no ground in partial identity, nor need we postulate such a case of partial identity. Finally, in the last chapter I argue that symmetry is the ground for

necessities wherein a determinate property falls under a determinable- say 'red is a colour'. In total, I show step by step that symmetry can have a greater role in developing and reestablishing Armstrongian metaphysics, in particular when he comes to postulate truthmakers for necessary truths.

**Key words:**

Armstrong, Metaphysics, Truthmaker, Partial identity, Necessity, Symmetry, Laws, Internal relation, Instantiation.