Professors advocate new electoral system for Brussels

Eight Belgian academics, including VUB professors Dave Sinardet and Kris Deschouwer, are proposing a thorough reform of Brussels’ electoral system. In a position paper published by Brussels Studies, they argue for a single electoral college with bilingual lists, while retaining guaranteed representation for both language groups. The proposal is not a final solution but an invitation to debate. The authors acknowledge that their plan does not solve every problem, but they hope it will pave the way towards a more efficient and democratic Brussels.

The current system dates back to the 1970s and 1980s, when language was the dominant dividing line in Brussels. Today, things are different: only 5 per cent of Brussels residents have Dutch as their sole mother tongue, while political debates mainly revolve around mobility, security and governance. Yet the double electoral college remains, leading to inefficiency and deadlock. Government formation after the June 2024 elections dragged on for months, partly because the system forces two separate majorities to come together. According to the academic authors of “An Electoral System for Today’s Brussels”, the current arrangement with two separate electoral colleges for Dutch- and French-speakers no longer reflects the reality of a super-diverse capital.

One Electoral College, Two Guarantees
The professors advocate a radically simpler system: a single electoral college in which all Brussels residents vote together. Candidates would no longer be able to rely on a linguistically defined segment but would have to seek support from the entire population. The proposal retains two key guarantees: bilingual lists and fixed representation for both language groups. Specifically, there would remain 72 seats for French-speakers and 17 for Dutch-speakers, to ensure the functioning of the Community Commissions and federal parity. For linguistically sensitive issues, a double majority would still be required.

To put this into practice, the authors present two possible models. The parallel formula allocates seats per language group based on votes for sub-lists. The downside of this system is that it becomes virtually impossible for single-language Dutch-speaking lists to win a seat.
The alternative, the so-called corrective formula, works differently: first, all seats are distributed according to the total number of votes, then a correction is applied to respect the 72/17 ratio. This approach makes Dutch-speaking lists viable, especially if the electoral threshold drops from 5 to 3 per cent.

Greater Legitimacy
According to the authors, “expensive” and “cheap” seats would disappear, and the legitimacy of elected representatives would be strengthened by their proposal. Coalition negotiations would proceed more quickly, as language compromises would be made within lists rather than after the elections.